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Mending the Social Compact:




B Y the year 2000, one-half of the population of the United
States may be living in common ownership housing.' If "com-
mon ownership housing" is interpreted to include not just condo-
miniums but any housing development with a property owners'
association and extensive common properties, that prediction may
prove to be conservative. In much of the country builders seem to
be constructing little else.
As the number of planned communities has grown, so has the
amount of litigation involving their common properties. One of the
most significant forms of common property lawsuits is the action
against the community developer for alleged construction defects.
These cases routinely involve millions of dollars and hundreds, even
thousands, of interested parties. Whatever other relief they may
* A.B., Lafayette College, 1970; J.D., Cornell University, 1973. Professor Natelson is
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demic year will be Visiting Associate Professor of Law, University of Montana. Prior to
teaching he practiced real estate law in New York and Colorado for twelve years. He is
the author of numerous articles on real estate and a book on condominiums and other
planned communities. Professor Natelson's forthcoming book on the Law of Property
Owners' Associations will be published by Little, Brown and Company.
Professor Natelson gratefully acknowledges the contribution to this Article of his
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I S. LEE, BUYER'S HANDBOOK FOR COOPERATIVES AND CONDOMINIUMS 4 (1978).
Additional statistics on condominiums appear in D. CLURMAN, F. JACKSON & E. HE-
BARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 2-3 (1984). The term that will be em-
ployed here for common ownership housing developments is "planned community."
The phrase is derived from the UNIF. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1, 7
U.L.A. 231 (1982).
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want, the plaintiffs almost always seek expectancy damages. If they
prevail, it is, of course, necessary to fairly measure and allocate
those damages.
Despite the importance of the subject, an adequate guide for mea-
suring expectancy damages in common property defects cases has
not yet been developed. Scholarly journals have been nearly silent,2
and while some courts have dealt with the matter surprisingly well,
several have made serious mistakes.
This Article suggests several mechanisms by which damages in
these cases can be measured and allocated in a straightforward
manner. These mechanisms are designed to be fair to defendants
and to absent parties and to take into account the variations in the
rules of construction liability applied by different states. These
mechanisms are developed through successive illustrations and for-
mulae in Part III and are summarized in a step-by-step procedure in
Part V.
I
CONTEXT OF THE PROBLEM
A. Some Complicating Factors
The question of how to measure and allocate damages to com-
mon properties arises most frequently when, in a suit by unit own-
ers against the developer of a planned community, the plaintiffs
have proven developer responsibility for one or more construction
defects on the basis of one or more liability theories. The number of
reported cases indicates that the question has arisen often enough,
but several complicating factors, discussed below, have made its so-
lution difficult.
1. Allocation of Property Ownership and Maintenance
One factor complicating the development of a general measure of
expectancy damages is the difference between various communities'
allocation of property ownership and maintenance responsibilities.
Ownership distribution differs according to whether the complex is
a condominium, a single family home development, or some other
type of planned community. Maintenance responsibilities may vary
without much regard for allocation of formal legal title to property.
Most of the reported litigation has involved communities which
2 There is, however, a very brief treatment in Pearlstein, Developer Liability for De-
fects in Condominiums, 74 ILL. B.J. 18 (1985).
[Vol. 66, 1987]
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are in condominium ownership.3  Condominium ownership is
closely defined by statute in every state. In order to qualify as a
condominium, the individual ownership/co-ownership division
must meet the applicable statutory requirements.4 Generally, a
"condominium" community must give each individual property
owner title to a three-dimensional block of air space. The statute
may require that this air space be confined within a building,' or it
may authorize its extension out-of-doors so as to include patios and
balconies.6 Appurtenant to ownership of each air space, and insep-
arable from it, is a fixed percentage interest in all parts of the condo-
minium outside the individually owned blocks of air space. These
co-owned portions of the complex are designated "common ele-
ments" or "general common elements."7 They include buildings'
3 The predominance of reported cases involving condominiums (as opposed to other
kinds of planned communities) is reflected in this Article.
"Condominium" is a Latin word of postclassical coinage meaning "co-ownership."
Because the term is Latin and because condominiums were imported into the United
States from civil law countries, a great many writers have reached the false conclusion
that the institution was known in ancient Rome. See, e.g., B. HARWOOD, REAL Es-
TATE PRINCIPLES 485 (1986); J. BRUCE, J. ELY & C. BOSTICK, CASES AND MATERI-
ALS ON MODERN PROPERTY LAW 3 (1984). This writer has always doubted this story,
see R. NATELSON, HOW TO BUY AND SELL A CONDOMINIUM 13 (1981), and recent
research has revealed it to be a myth, although an extraordinarily well-entrenched one.
See Natelson, Comments on the Historiography of Condominium: The Myth of Roman
Origin, 12 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 17 (1987), for extensive citations and a brief history
of condominium.
4 Country Greens Village One Owner's Ass'n v. Meyers, 158 Ga. App. 609, 610, 281
S.E.2d 346, 348 (1981) (townhouse community in which association owned the common
areas held to be outside the statutory definition of "condominium"). But see Bonner
Properties, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of the Township of Franklin, 185 N.J. Super. 553, 566-
67, 449 A.2d 1350, 1361-62 (Law Div. 1982) (extending application of condominium
statute to a hybrid community).
5 See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-33-103(4) (1982) (requiring that an "individual air
space unit" consist of "enclosed" areas); see also OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 60, § 503(b)
(West 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 1302(1) (1975).
6 A number of statutes do not require that individual air space be limited by the
confines of a building. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.103(23) (West Supp. 1987).
More specific authorization for including balconies, terraces, and other appurtenances
as part of an air space block is found in N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-e(14) (McKinney
Supp. 1987). Balconies were apparently held to be part of the individual units in
Roundtree Villas Ass'n v. 4701 Kings Corp., 282 S.C. 415, 321 S.E.2d 46 (1984), but it
is unclear from the opinion whether the complex was truly a condominium.
7 The term must be distinguished from the term "common area," which is usually
employed to characterize property titled to the association. See, e.g., Raven's Cove
Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 787, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334,
335 (1981). The Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act, now adopted in Alaska,
Connecticut, and West Virginia, applies the term "common elements" to both co-owned
and association-owned property, but the practice has not been adopted by other juris-
dictions. UN1F. COMMON INTEREST OWNERSHIP ACT § 1-103(4), 7 U.L.A. 240 (1982).
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structural members (floors, walls, roofs), facilities within the air
space blocks utilized by more than one unit owner (e.g., common
pipes), and the grounds, recreational facilities, and other exterior
portions of the complex.' Although the condominium association
may hold title to other parcels of realty,9 it cannot hold title to the
common elements; its functions with respect to the common ele-
ments are purely those of a community manager and regulator.
Those functions are funded by assessments levied upon the unit
owners. 
10
Most condominium documents set aside portions of the general
common elements (for example, garages and balconies) for the use
of certain owners to the exclusion of others. These portions are
usually designated "limited common elements."
As a general rule, the condominium association has maintenance
responsibility for commonly owned property while individual
homeowners must care for property within their blocks of air space.
This is only a general rule, however, and exceptions are frequently
encountered. I
Because of the importance of co-owned property in condominium
communities, most of the reported condominium cases center
around alleged defects in such property. Allegations of deficiencies
in property titled to the condominium association are more rare. 12
8 For a non-technical introduction, see R. NATELSON, supra note 3, at 15-22.
9 This is specifically or impliedly authorized in some condominium statutes. See, e.g.,
ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 30, §§ 318.3, 318.4(g) (Smith-Hurd 1986); UNIF. CONDOMINIUM
ACT § 3-102(a)(8), 7 U.L.A. 502 (1980). But see Towerhouse Condominium, Inc. v.
Millman, 475 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1985) (holding that statutory authorization for the associ-
ation to acquire condominium units did not include authorization to hold title to other
realty). For an example of a condominium declaration in which association ownership
of property is authorized, see IA (Part 2) P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDOMINIUM
LAW AND PRACTICE, at app. 148 (Supp. 1987).
One of the condominium associations for which the author served as corporate coun-
sel while he was in private practice held the deeds to certain recreation areas (club-
house, tennis courts, swimming pools, etc.). However, most of the community's
grounds were co-owned common elements.
0 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 718.115(2) (West Supp. 1986).
11 The most frequent exceptions are for the limited common elements, for which
maintenance responsibility is occasionally in the owner of the unit to which they are
appurtenant. See, e.g., Condominium Declaration, Cottonwood Villas (Adams County,
Colo.) § 17(a)(3) (air conditioning units) (on file at the Oregon Law Review). A decla-
ration amendment altering maintenance responsibilities was at issue in Hillsboro Light
Towers, Inc. v. Sherrill, 474 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). See also UNIF.
CONDOMINIUM ACT § 2-108 comment 1, 7 U.L.A. 470 (1980).
12 The author has been unable to find any reported cases. However, the association
mentioned in supra note 9 sued the developer on claims for defective construction of
both common elements and association-owned recreation areas.
[Vol. 66, 1987]
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While most of the reported common property defect cases involve
condominium communities, other kinds of communities have also
been the subject of litigation. In a few cases, the development in
question is a complex of single family homes sharing common
properties.' 3 These subdivisions have been popular for some time, 4
especially in resort areas. The subdivision's common properties are
usually titled to the homeowners' association rather than to the unit
owners. Moreover, the common areas are usually less extensive,
and less vital to day-to-day living, than those in other planned com-
munities-a fact which may account for the relative paucity of re-
ported decisions.
A significant minority of common property defects cases arise in
planned communities which do not qualify as condominiums, but
which are more interdependent than most subdivisions of single
family homes. Builders bestow a variety of names upon these devel-
opments: "town home" communities, garden homes, patio homes,
cluster homes, and the like. All will be referred to herein as
"hybrids."
15
One popular plan provides for: (a) individual ownership of a
town house unit and the lot on which it is situated (including indi-
vidual ownership of airspace above the lot), (b) association owner-
ship of all areas not encompassed by the lot, and (c) association
maintenance of common areas and the exterior portions of all build-
ings. 6 Other ownership/maintenance splits are possible, and some
13 One significant case involving such property is Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 18 Cal. 3d 355, 556 P.2d 750, 134 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1976).
14 Mandatory property owners associations arose in America in the nineteenth cen-
tury. URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, THE HOMES ASSOcIATION HANDBOOK 39-40 (1964).
Early cases include Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank,
278 N.Y. 248, 15 N.E.2d 793 (1938) (community established in 1911) and Prudential
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Wetzel, 248 N.W. 791 (Wis. 1933) (community established in 1919).
The number of cases involving such associations rose sharply in the 1950s. See, e.g.,
Sheahan v. Upper Greenwood Lake Property Owners' Ass'n, 36 N.J. Super. 133, 115
A.2d 129 (1955); Carranor Woods Property Owners' Ass'n, 153 N.E.2d 681 (Ohio App.
1957); Ottawa Shores Home Owners Ass'n v. Lechlak, 344 Mich. 366, 73 N.W.2d 840
(1955); Baxendale v. Property Owners' Ass'n of N. Shore Acres, 309 N.Y. 871, 131
N.E.2d 287 (1955). These cases generally do not involve common property defects.
15 The term "hybrid" is employed in Bonner Properties, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 185
N.J. Super. 553, 449 A.2d 1350 (1982).
16 The popularity of this scheme may well have its origin in a form set of covenants
issued by the Federal Housing Administration. See UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY
ACT, prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 1 (1980). Examples of this plan appear in Country
Greens Village One Owner's Ass'n v. Meyers, 158 Ga. App. 609, 281 S.E.2d 346 (1981);
Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 334 (1981); Spring Mill Townhomes Ass'n v. Osla Fin. Serv., 124 Ill. App. 3d
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appear in the reported cases.' 7
It is important to keep in mind, moreover, that the division of
maintenance responsibility in hybrid communities may deviate sig-
nificantly from the division of formal property ownership. 8 The
dividing lines between individual and common maintenance in each
community, like those between individual and common ownership,
can be determined only by consulting the community's operative
documents. Even the allocation of responsibility for each parcel's
property tax may differ from the division of title ownership. 19 Thus
any system of calculating and allocating expectancy damages must
account for such variations between different planned communities.
2. Interests Protected
Another factor which has complicated the measurement and
allocation of damages in planned communities has been the signifi-
cant number of the interests which need, or seem to need, protec-
tion. Included in these interests are (a) individual enjoyment of
defect-free units, (b) association interest in the units to the extent
the association has maintenance responsibility therefor,
(c) individual enjoyment of the common properties, (d) association
interest in maintenance of the common properties, (e) the level of
the monthly, quarterly, or annual homeowner assessments (dues,
maintenance fees) paid by unit owners, and (f) the interest of indi-
vidual unit owners in preventing damage to their units resulting
from common property defects.
774, 465 N.E.2d 490 (1983). This scheme is also the form of hybrid community con-
templated by the uniform "Planned Unit Development Rider" issued by the Federal
National Mortgage Ass'n (FNMA) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.
(FHLMC). R. KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 416 (1979).
17 An example of another ownership scheme is found in Del Mar Beach Club Own-
ers' Ass'n v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981)
(association owned all of complex except for individual air space units). See also Cove-
nants, Magna Carta Townhomes (Denver County, Colo.) (entire complex divided
among unit owners with extensive "common easements") (on file with Oregon Law
Review); UNIF. PLANNED COMMUNITY AcT, prefatory note, 7B U.L.A. 1 (1980).
8 For instance, it is common for the association to have maintenance responsibility
over the exteriors of privately owned units. See, e.g., Declaration of Covenants, York-
town Homes Association (Adams County, Colo.), art. vi, § 1. (on file at the Oregon
Law Review.)
19 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-1-103(10) (Supp. 1985). The issue of taxing asso-
ciation-owned property is discussed in Note, The Real Property Taxation of Common
Areas in Planned Unit Developments: Advocating the Rights of Homeowner Associations,
1983 UTAH L. REV. 825.
[Vol. 66, 1987]
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3. Theories of Liability
Still another complicating factor in measuring damages is the va-
riety of legal theories under which a developer may be found liable.
One common basis of liability is for breach of express contract, a
rubric that includes (a) violation of an express warranty,20
(b) violation of the terms of the legal documents governing the com-
munity,2 and (c) developer breach or unilateral alteration of con-
tracts of which unit purchasers are found to be third party
beneficiaries.22
An even more frequent basis for a finding of developer liability
for common property defects is breach of implied warranty. Most
states now recognize implied warranties running from professional
developers (or "builder/vendors") to the purchasers of new homes,
including residential units in planned communities. These warran-
ties are commonly known as warranties of "habitability," "work-
manship," or "merchantability," and they generally protect the
purchaser against any latent defects caused by poor workmanship,
irrespective of the fault or lack of fault of the developer.23 Some
states also provide protection from patent defects,24 and many
states have extended protection under these warranties to remote
purchasers.25
Another popular theory of liability is developer misrepresenta-
tion, which includes concealment and nondisclosure. To the extent
such misrepresentation is fraudulent, or characterized as "construc-
tive fraud,"26 it may be a basis for an award of punitive damages.27
2 0 An express warranty is usually created by the printed sales contract, by oral repre-
sentation or model, or by statements in promotional literature. Diamond & Raines,
Consumer Warranty Issues in the Sale of Residential Condominiums, 20 REAL PROP.,
PROB. & TR. J. 933, 934 (1985) [hereinafter Diamond]. See also Welch v. Point of
Americas Condominium Apartments, Inc., 373 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
21 Council of Unit Owners of Pilot Point Condominium v. Realty Growth Investors,
436 A.2d 1268 (Del. Ch. 1981), aff'd sub nom., Realty Growth Investors v. Council of
Unit Owners, 453 A.2d 450 (Del. 1982).
2 2 See, e.g., Wiley v. Berg, 282 Or. 9, 578 P.2d 384 (1978).
23 The applicable law is surveyed in Diamond, supra note 20.
24 For example, New Jersey: McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283
(1979) (builder held liable for lack of potable water despite home purchaser's knowledge
of the defect before closing). The better view, however, is to restrict coverage to latent
defects only. Herlihy v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 92 Ill. App. 3d 310, 316, 415 N.E.2d
1224, 1228 (1980). See also Conley v. Coral Ridge Properties, Inc., 396 So. 2d 1220,
1222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
25 The cases on both sides of the privity question are collected in Richards v. Power-
craft Homes, Inc., 139 Ariz. 242, 244-45, 678 P.2d 427, 429-30 (1984).
2 6 See, e.g., O'Quinn v. Beach Assoc., 272 S.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 734 (1978).
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When the developer's misrepresentation is innocent, the issues in-
volved become indistinguishable from those surrounding breach of
express warranty.
In jurisdictions which have not yet recognized the implied war-
ranty of habitability, negligence remains the chief alternative.2 8
Moreover, some states which do recognize an implied warranty
have imposed a privity requirement that precludes warranty protec-
tion beyond the first purchase from the builder/vendor. A privity
requirement is usually absent in negligence cases.29
Strict tort liability has been adopted by the courts of three juris-
dictions-California, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia-in
transactions involving the sale of defective homes. Privity is irrele-
vant in these cases.3°
Breach offiduciary duty is a theory of liability with special appli-
cation to planned communities. Since an association manages, and
perhaps owns, the common properties, a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the association and the owners is said to be formed at about
the same time the documents governing the community become op-
erative. Moreover, this association is often incorporated. Almost
invariably, the association's initial directors are nominees of the de-
veloper, and the developer may retain corporate control for years
after the first units are sold. Indeed, the operative documents may
enable the developer to dominate the association as long as any
units remain unsold. 31 Courts have almost routinely imposed stan-
dards, loosely characterized as "fiduciary," upon the controlling de-
veloper, his nominees, or both, and have even extended such duties
to present and future unit owners as well as to the association as an
entity.32
27 See Graham v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 594 S.W.2d 723 (Tenn. 1979) (though puni-
tive damages were possible, they were denied where purchasers were aware of defects).
28 Hyatt & Rhoads, Concepts of Liability in the Development and Administration of
Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915, 962
(1976) [hereinafter Hyatt].
29 Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983) (negligence claim
limited to latent defects); Parliament Towers Condominium v. Parliament House Re-
alty, Inc., 377 So. 2d 976 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
30 Del Mar Beach Club Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal.
App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981); Hermes v. Staiano, 181 N.J. Super. 424, 437
A.2d 925 (Law Div. 1981).
31 Abuse by developers while in control of associations has led to a number of statu-
tory responses. See, e.g., Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Protection Abuse
Relief Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3616 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 30, § 318.2
(1979).
32 The law of fiduciary duty with respect to homeowners' associations is reviewed in
[Vol. 66, 1987]
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Most fiduciary duty cases arise as a result of developer misman-
agement of the corporate or financial affairs of the association.33
Breach of fiduciary duty has also been a common allegation where
the developer is responsible for construction deficiencies, but the
courts have been reluctant to characterize poor construction as a
breach of fiduciary duty.34 Hence, this Article will not consider fi-
duciary duty remedies, except to the extent that expectancy dam-
ages may be relevant.
4. The Parties Plaintiff
Calculation and apportionment of damages in common property
defects cases have also been complicated by the fact that the parties
plaintiff vary from case to case. In some rare cases 35 the plaintiffs
are individual unit owners who do not represent anyone but them-
selves. More frequently encountered is the suit initiated by the
property owners' association, in which the association as an entity is
the only plaintiff, or is a kind of class representative on behalf of its
present or former members. A few courts have refused to grant
condominium associations standing in common property cases be-
cause they do not actually hold title to the common elements.
Thus, in some states it has become necessary for individual owners
to commence class actions against their developer. However, such
individually maintained actions tend to be inefficient and expensive,
laden with technical traps for the homeowners prosecuting them.
Fortunately, limitations on association standing have now been re-
pudiated in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions 36 and can
Hyatt, supra note 28, at 973-77. For a more recent treatment, together with a critique
of judicial decisions and legislative enactments holding developers to strictly "fiduciary"
standards, see Natelson, Keeping Faith: Fiduciary Obligations in Property Owners As-
sociations, 11 VERMONT L. REV. 421 (1986). Illustrative cases include B & J Holding
Corp. v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d 141 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Raven's Cove Townhomes,
Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1981); Papalexiou
v. Tower West Condominium, 167 N.J. Super. 516, 401 A.2d 280 (1979).
33 E.g., B & JHolding Corp., 353 So. 2d 141; Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc., 114 Cal.
App. 3d 783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334.
34 See, e.g., Olympian West Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Kramer, 427 So. 2d 1039
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Lakeview Townhomes Condominium Ass'n v. East Fla.
Dev. Corp., 454 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Kelley v. Astor Investors, Inc.,
123 Ill. App. 3d 593, 462 N.E.2d 996 (1984), aff'd, 106 Ill. 2d 505, 478 N.E.2d 1346
(1985).
35 See Rouse v. Glascam Builders, Inc., 101 Wash. 2d 127, 677 P.2d 125 (1984).
36 Most states now have statutory provisions specifically authorizing associations to
sue for common element defects, or have judicially interpreted their statutory law to
permit such actions, or have adopted this position by judicial rule or common law.
Several of these jurisdictions had at one time required class actions but have reversed
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definitively be said to still be the law in very few. 37
Since owners frequently sell their units and are replaced by other
owners, members of a plaintiff class or of a plaintiff association may
vary over the course of the litigation. This can be a problem when
the applicability of a particular theory of recovery may depend
upon privity with the developer. Also, there may be unit owners
who purchased their property for investment purposes. They will
not be entitled to recover on the implied warranty theory, and or-
thodox damage law would require that their damages be calculated
differently in any event. These problems can be solved by employ-
ing the damage allocation methods discussed in Part III.3"
themselves, e.g., Florida (FLA. R. CIv. PRO. 1.221) and California (CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE § 374 (West Supp. 1986)). Other jurisdictions permitting associations to sue for
common element defects are as follows:
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.260 (1985); Arizona: ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-
1242 (Supp. 1986); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-80a(5) (West 1986); see
also Greentree Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. RSP Corp., 36 Conn. Supp. 160, 415 A.2d
248 (1980); District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1848(a)(2) (1981); Hawaii:
HAW. REV. STAT. § 514A-93 (Supp. 1984); Idaho: IDAHO CODE § 55-1513 (1979);
Illinois: ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 30, § 309.1(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); Indiana: IND.
CODE ANN. § 32-1-6-30 (Burns 1980); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3127 (1983);
Louisiana: LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1123.102(4) (West Supp. 1986); Maine: ME.
REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 33, § 1603-102(4) (Supp. 1986); Maryland: MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 1 1-109(d)(4) (Supp. 1986); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch.
183A, § 10(b)(4) (West 1977); Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN., § 559.160 (West
Supp. 1986); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 515A.3-102(a)(4) (West Supp. 1987);
Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 448.3-102(4) (Vernon 1986); Montana: MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-23-901(1) (1985); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8 B-15(a) (West Supp.
1986); see also Siller v. Hartz Mountain Assoc., 93 N.J. 370, 461 A.2d 568, cert. denied,
464 U.S. 961 (1983); New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-7C-2(4) (1982); New York:
N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-dd (McKinney 1968); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 47A-26 (1984); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5311.20 (Anderson 1981);
Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 60, § 852.C (West 1986); Oregon: OR. REV. STAT.
§ 94.146(4)(d) (1985); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 68, § 3302(4) (Purdon Supp.
1986); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 34-36.1-3.02 (Supp. 1986); South Carolina:
Queen's Grant Villas Horizontal Property Regimes I-V v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 335
S.E.2d 365 (S.C. 1985); Texas: TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 81.201(b) (Vernon 1984);
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-8-33 (1973); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 27, § 1327
(Supp. 1986); Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.80(bl) (1986); Washington: WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 64.32.240 (Supp. 1986); West Virginia: W. VA. CODE § 36B-3-
102(a)(4) (Supp. 1986). A few states, such as Wisconsin, have provisions that might be
interpreted to confer standing, but have not yet been construed. See, e.g., Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 703.15(3) (West 1981).
37 See Summerhouse Condominium Ass'n v. Majestic Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 44 Colo.
App. 495, 615 P.2d 71 (1980); Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States v.
Tinsley Mill Village, 249 Ga. 768, 294 S.E.2d 495 (1982); Deal v. 999 Lakeshore Ass'n,
94 Nev. 301, 304-05, 579 P.2d 775, 777 (1978) (dictum).
38 See infra notes 70-91 and accompanying text.
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5. Whether Damage Can Be Repaired
Standard damage theory suggests that awards for irreparable in-
jury to residential property should be calculated differently from
awards for injury that can be remedied. Thus, when faced with a
case in which the cost of repair would be grossly disproportionate to
the diminution in market value resulting from the defect, the courts
often award the diminution in market value so as to avoid "eco-
nomic waste." Obviously, a community may at the same time suffer
from defects which are "remediable" and defects which are not.
Any unified theory of common property expectancy damages must
take both kinds of loss into account.39
B. A Simplifying Factor
Fortunately, resolving the problem of expectancy damages is the
key to determining the scope of relief in the overwhelming majority
of common defects cases. Resort to other remedies is relatively
rare, even, as we shall see, when the theory of liability does not
sound in contract.
Rescission, for example, is of little practical importance in most
such cases. A lawsuit for common property defects will usually
come to judgment years after the closing of title on most of the units
in the complex.' Usually the defects were discovered some time
after most homeowners purchased their units. In many, if not most
cases, there has been a period in which the developer has attempted
to remedy matters, but, for one reason or another, has not been
fully successful in doing so. Thus, by the time of judgment, the
association and the individual unit owners have expended consider-
able time and money finishing the job themselves. For those
problems which have been or which can be remedied, they want
reimbursement for the cost of repair. For defects that have proven
to be irremediable, they usually want compensation to reflect their
loss in value or any increase in future expenses due to those defects.
In addition, whatever their complaints, the owners are usually
well-settled within their units, which may also have increased in
39 See infra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
40 This fact of course renders irrelevant the "out-of-pocket rule" prevailing in many
states, whereby a contract purchaser is limited to recovery of out-of-pocket expenses
when suing a seller in default before closing. D. DOBBs, REMEDIES 595-96 (1973). See,
e.g., Vogel v. Vandiver, 373 So. 2d 366 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("loss of bargain"
damages inappropriate in absence of bad faith). Some of the factors militating against
rescission in most cases are discussed briefly in Wiley v. Berg, 282 Or. 9, 20, 578 P.2d
384, 391 (1978).
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value since the time of purchase. The plaintiffs, therefore, seldom
elect to have their transactions rescinded.
Neither is the remedy of specific performance of much signifi-
cance in common property defect cases. There is, of course, a cer-
tain judicial reluctance to order specific performance of
construction contracts.4" Moreover, most associations and home-
owners do not care to see the company responsible for their
problems undertake to do the work again.42 They want the work
done, but they want it performed by firms of their own choosing.
Orders of restitution and awards of punitive damages are also
rare in cases of this nature, primarily because the most obvious the-
oretical basis for either-breach of fiduciary duty-has not yet
served as an independent ground of liability for construction de-
fects.4 3 Awards of punitive damages are rare (judging by the rela-
tive absence of awards in reported common defects cases) and are
not, of course, easily reducible to calculable form.
Thus, to the extent that we resolve issues of expectancy damages,
we resolve the most important remedies issues for common prop-
erty construction defects cases.
II
EXPECTANCY DAMAGES: INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS
Before proceeding to the calculation of expectancy damages in
Part III, it is appropriate to consider briefly two preliminary issues:
41 D. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 907. Homeowners' associations are rarely in the posi-
tion alleged by the plaintiff in Brummel v. Clifton Realty Co., 146 Md. 56, 125 A. 905
(1924) (financial inability to repair). Even when they are in such a position, they gener-
ally prefer damages to specific performance. The author has uncovered no reported
repair cases in which specific performance was requested, although injunctions and spe-
cific relief have been utilized to ensure developer compliance with other obligations.
See, e.g., St. Francis Courts Condominium Ass'n v. Investors Real Estate, 104 Ill. App.
3d 663, 432 N.E.2d 1274 (1982) (ordering removal of encroachment onto common ele-
ments); Wiley, 282 Or. 9, 578 P.2d 384 (reinstating original terms of an improperly
modified lease-option).
42 In practice, a developer will frequently present a settlement offer by which it offers
to make repairs itself rather than pay damages. These offers are usually resisted by
homeowners' associations, and, if not rejected out-of-hand, are usually accepted with
great reluctance.
43 The possibility was left open in Governors Grove Condominium Ass'n v. Hill Dev.
Corp., 36 Conn. Supp. 144, 414 A.2d 1177 (1980), but the Florida courts have fore-
closed it in their state. Olympian West Condominium Ass'n v. Kramer, 427 So. 2d
1039 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Lakeview Townhomes Condominium Ass'n v. East
Fla. Dev. Corp., 454 So. 2d 576 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). For a general discussion of
the conceptual problems involved see Natelson, supra note 32, at 464-70.
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(1) the extent to which expectancy damages will be a relevant rem-
edy for tortious loss, and (2) whether the "difference in value" por-
tion of the expectancy award should, in most cases, be based upon
the cost to repair the damage or upon the diminution in the market
price resulting from the damage.
A. Liability Theories to Which Expectancy
Damages Are Relevant
"Expectancy damages"-the difference in value between what
was promised and what was given, plus certain consequential
losses-is of course the name applied to the most commonly used
formula for calculating financial awards for breach of contract. As
one would expect, this is the usual measure of recovery for common
area defects when the plaintiffs prove liability on a warranty or
other contract theory."
The expectancy measure has also been employed in construction
cases when the theory of recovery is misrepresentation, negligence,
or strict tort liability. Thus, if property is tortiously represented to
be free of defects, and it proves to be otherwise, the plaintiffs have
been given the option of rescinding the contract or affirming it. As
suggested in the previous Part, they will nearly always affirm it.
They will then be entitled to the benefit of their bargain plus reim-
bursement for certain other loss-that is to say, they will be entitled
to expectancy damages.45
The same measure is applied when the cause of the injury is negli-
gence. Any developer performing work pursuant to contract has an
obligation to parties who may foreseeably be affected "to perform
the work subject to the contract with reasonable care and skill."46
44 See, e.g., Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So.
2d 515, 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Smith v. Chang, 467 So. 2d 1277, 1280 (La. Ct.
App. 1985); Goldenfarb v. Land Design, Inc., 409 A.2d 662, 665-66 (Me. 1979); Starfish
Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 458 A.2d 805, 814 (Md. 1983); Starman
v. Associated Estates Corp., 401 N.E.2d 952, 953 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pleas 1980).
45 D. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 594, 598; A. HARRELL, TOWARD A UNIFIED LAW OF
REMEDIES 212-13, 220-21 (1981) (unpublished LL.M. Thesis, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity) (on file at the Oregon Law Review); Occidental Land, Inc. v. Superior Court, 18
Cal. 3d 355, 365, 556 P.2d 750, 755, 134 Cal. Rptr. 388, 393 (1976); Stony Ridge Hill
Condominium Owners Ass'n v. Auerbach, 64 Ohio App. 2d 40, 48, 410 N.E.2d 782,
787-88 (1979).
46 Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1043 (Colo. 1983); see also
Towers Tenant Ass'n v. Towers Limited Partnership, 563 F. Supp. 566, 570-72 (D.D.C.
1983); Quail Hollow E. Condominium Ass'n v. Donald J. Scholz Co., 47 N.C. App.
518, 268 S.E.2d 12 (1980); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324A (1965).
Identity in the measures of recovery between warranty and negligence is usually merely
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A developer who fails to meet that standard of care is liable for the
damage, which is defined as the difference between the value of an
improvement made with reasonable care and skill and the value of
what was in fact given (plus reimbursement for certain other loss).
In the overwhelming number of cases this measure will be identical
to contract expectancy damages.
The same measure of damages has also been held applied in strict
tort liability cases.4 7 Indeed,
[t]he legal effort in all such cases is to compensate the landowner
for the damage done. From this point of view it makes no differ-
ence whether the substantive theory is trespass, negligence, con-
tract, or strict liability in tort--or even waste or nuisance. What
is important is to identify the landowner's interests and to com-
pensate for the damage done to them.48
B. Diminution in Market Value vs. Cost to Repair
In real estate cases, the "difference in value" component of the
expectancy damage formula has traditionally been calculated by
either: (1) subtracting the market value of the property as delivered
from the market value as promised (diminution in market value), or
(2) awarding the cost of putting the property into its promised con-
dition (cost to repair).49
Courts applying the diminution in market value approach to ex-
pectancy damages have traditionally done so by comparing the ap-
praised value of the defective property with an estimate of value
without defects. Thus, if a builder promised a structure worth
$100,000 and delivered one appraised at $90,000, damages in the
amount of $10,000 would be awarded. The justification for this ap-
proach is the belief that the property owner can then sell his defec-
tive real estate for $90,000 and use the proceeds, together with the
damage award, to acquire equivalent property.5"
assumed without being explicitly stated. See, e.g., Welch v. Point of Americas Condo-
minium Apartments, Inc., 373 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
47 Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969); Tow-
ers Tenant Ass'n, 563 F. Supp. at 574, n.5.
48 D. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 311. For similar wording, see Raven's Cove
Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d 783, 802, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334,
345 (1981).
49 C. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES 647-50 (1935); D. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 897;
Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1167
(1970).
50 A. HARRELL, supra note 45, at 154. See generally Farnsworth, supra note 49, at
1160.
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This substitutionary theory makes sense in many other economic
contexts, but is often inappropriate in cases involving defective real
estate. This is particularly, although not exclusively, true in cases
in which the defective property is owner-occupied real estate. In
such situations, cost to repair usually is seen as the preferable mea-
sure.5  The usual reasons given have been the "uniqueness" of real
estate (its special value to its owner, beyond its mere market
value) 2 and the perceived unfairness to the owner of permitting a
builder to ignore agreed upon specifications so long as he provides a
structure of equal market value.
5 3
There are other reasons for rejecting the diminution in market
value approach to measuring expectancy damages in cases involving
owner-occupied residences. These reasons arise out of aspects of
the residential sales market that cause it to differ from markets in
other products.
First, the nominal sales price of a property is influenced signifi-
cantly by the financing package that happens to be employed.
Which package is used may be largely a matter of accident. Tradi-
tional techniques of residential appraisal do not take into account
the influence of financing structure upon price.54
Second, there are various aspects of the real estate market which
tend to exaggerate the actual impact of construction defects upon
saleability. Most residential property is sold through real estate
brokers. Due to increasing liability exposure, brokers often hesitate
to list defective property. Moreover, the residential market tends to
be more irrational than some others. Prospective home buyers
often look more for "magic" than for value and may shun property
with admitted defects--even if the asking price is low enough to
compensate for the existence of the defects.55
51 D. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 314-15; A. HARRELL, supra note 45, at 155. See infra,
note 63.
52 Farnsworth, supra note 49, at 1154-56; A. HARRELL, supra note 45, at 154-55.
53 D. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 898.
54 The availability of Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Veteran's Adminis-
tration (VA) financing may result in prices higher than would otherwise be negotiated,
since FHA and VA interest rates and downpayment requirements are generally lower
than for conventional loans. The presence of some rather unconventional "conven-
tional" loans--such as graduated payment mortgages (GPM's) and adjustable rate
mortgages (ARM's)-also impact on price, as does the practice of owner financing.
55 The honest seller of a defective home, who freely admits its problems, may well
find himself at a disadvantage when competing for a sale with the dishonest seller. This
may be true even when the latter's property displays rather obvious warning signs, such
as cracking, the presence of new paint and plaster, and basement water lines. Self-
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Another distorting factor is real property's immovability. In the
event of local oversupply, it cannot be shipped to areas where the
need for homes is such that buyers are willing to purchase defective
units.
The cumulative effect of these market factors is that the owner of
defective property may be unable to sell it for anything approximat-
ing appraisal value. Indeed, a willingness to drop one's price some-
what may be rewarded only by "low ball" offers from bargain-
hunters seeking to profit from the seller's perceived desperation. In
such situations the actual proceeds from a sale are not likely to be
sufficient to enable the owner to acquire substitute property if he
has been awarded damages based only upon reduction in appraised
value.5 6
Despite the foregoing, there are situations in which, at least
prima facie, diminution in market value seems a more appropriate
measure than cost to repair. For example, the damage may be irrep-
arable or the cost to repair may exceed the diminution in market
value to a disproportionate degree. Alternately, some or all of the
plaintiffs may be prior owners who, although suffering loss, have no
need for additional repairs; or certain units may be owned by inves-
tors rather than by the occupants and therefore have no special
value above their economic value. Each of these special situations
will be considered in the next section, which develops the formulae
necessary for calculating damages in common property defects
cases.
III
CALCULATION OF EXPECTANCY DAMAGES
A. Introduction
This Part develops the formulae necessary for calculating and al-
locating damages in common property defects cases. The Part be-
gins with certain equations applicable to expectancy damages
generally, then alters them so as to (a) calculate damage awards for
deception plays a large role in facilitating residential sales. If the seller openly admits a
defect, self-deception on the buyer's part is less likely.
56 Some cases and problems related to the distress sale are discussed in A. HARRELL,
supra note 45, at 107-10. "Market value" as appraisers employ the term, is usually
defined so as to exclude the distress sale: "The highest price in terms of money that a
property would bring in a competitive and open market under all conditions requisite to
a fair sale, the buyer and seller each acting prudently and knowledgeably and assuming
the price is not affected by undue stimulus." AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE
APPRAISERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 23 (7th ed. 1978) (emphasis supplied).
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planned communities, and (b) equitably divide those awards among
the persons entitled to share in them. Eight formulae are developed
in all. Among these are four Community Damage Formulae (em-
ployed to compute the compensable loss to an entire housing com-
plex), two Unit Damage Formulae (employed to apportion an
award among units), and two Individual Damage Formulae (em-
ployed to apportion an award among individual owners). Readers
interested primarily in applying these equations rather than tracing
their development processes are referred to Part V, which provides
a summary procedure for their application to actual cases.
57
B. The Farnsworth Formulae
In a celebrated article,58 Professor Farnsworth has digested much
of the law of contract damages to a series of formulae, several of
which will serve as starting points in our own calculations of com-
mon element damages. He thus sets forth his initial expectancy
equation:
Loss on the bargain = loss in value - cost avoided
Loss in value is defined as "the difference between the value to the
injured party of what the other party was to have done under the
contract and the value of what he in fact did. '"59 Cost avoided is the
portion of the injured party's obligation which he has avoided as a
57 It will assist the causes of brevity and clarity if, before proceeding further, we em-
ploy some standard abbreviations to denote the more common expressions appearing in
our equations. The following list will be employed:
D = damages to the entire community
D= damages attributable to Unit A
D = damages attributable to owner Al
LIV = loss in value
CTR = cost to repair (or cost to remedy or restore)
CA = cost avoided
DCA = direct cost avoided (for our purposes, this is the same as cost avoided)
OL = other loss
UL = unique loss
CCA = collateral cost avoided
CIL = collateral income lost
Dim/SP = diminution in (re-)sale price (including both defects which impact all units
equally and those which impact the particular unit disproportionately)
ComDim/SP = diminution in (re-)sale price due to defects common to the commu-
nity, Le., impacting all units equally
PIA = past increased assessments
FIA = future (projected) increased assessments
58 Farnsworth, supra note 49.
59 Id. at 1161.
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result of being excused from further performance when the other
party breached.
Professor Farnsworth points out that contract damages include,
not just loss on the bargain, but certain other costs as well, "such as
physical harm to the injured party's person or property and ex-
penses incurred by him in an attempt to salvage the transaction af-
ter breach. The general measure of recovery, then," he continues,
"is the sum of these two ingredients of the injured party's loss.
Damages = loss on the bargain + other loss."'
Farnsworth then combines the two equations to yield "Formula
A":
Damages = loss in value - cost avoided + other lOSS6 1
In symbolic form, this equation can be rendered:
D =LIV- CA + OL
C The First Community Damage Formula
Loss in value may, as noted in the previous section, be defined as
diminution in market value or as cost to repair. Farnsworth noted
the trend toward awarding cost to repair in noncommercial property
cases, 62 and since his article appeared in 1970, the trend has become
more pronounced. Virtually every reported common element case
to consider the issue has held cost to repair as the appropriate mea-
sure of loss in value, at least where the damage could be repaired.63
Moreover, since common property defect cases of the kind dis-
cussed herein are initiated after the sale has been closed and the
price of the units has been paid, cost avoided for the community as a
whole as a result of the builder's breach will almost invariably be
"zero."' Taking that into account, and substituting cost to repair
6O1d. at 1161-62.6 1 1d. at 1162.
62 1d. at 1168-69.
63 Some cases specifically authorizing recovery of cost to repair for common element
defects include Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d
783, 803, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334, 345 (1981); Juno By the Sea Condominium Apartments,
Inc. v. Juno By the Sea N. Condominium Ass'n, 418 So. 2d 1190, 1191-92 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982); Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406
So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); B & J Holding Corp. v. Weiss, 353 So. 2d
141, 143 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill. App. 3d 581,592-
93, 410 N.E.2d 902, 912 (1980); Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp.,
458 A.2d 805, 814 (Md. 1983); Kathan v. Bellows Falls Village Corp., 126 Vt. 86, 223
A.2d 470 (1966).64 However, cost avoided may be significant for individual members of the commu-
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for loss in value in Farnsworth's Formula A, we arrive at the
equation:
Damages = cost to repair + other loss
In symbolic form:
D = CTR + OL
This equation defines the damage to the entire community, includ-
ing, as we shall see, present and prior unit owners. This is the First
Community Damage Formula.
While the First Community Damage Formula is well supported
by case law,65 it remains inadequate in several ways: (1) it does not
provide a mechanism for compensating for defects which cannot be
repaired; (2) it does not distinguish between other loss suffered by
the community as a whole and other loss suffered by individuals;
(3) it does not distinguish between that portion of the award attribu-
table to the initial purchaser who suffered a lower sales price be-
cause of common property defects and the portion attributable to
the subsequent purchaser who took advantage of that lower sales
price; (4) it does not distinguish between the portions attributable to
(a) the owner who paid higher assessments during his period of
ownership so that repairs could be effectuated, and (b) his successor
in interest who, as a current association member, will benefit from a
judgment ordering that the association be reimbursed; and finally,
(5) it does not distinguish between portions of the award attributa-
ble to successive owners whose respective claims (warranty, negli-
gence, misrepresentation) might not all be valid under applicable
state law.
D. The Second Community Damage Formula
In order to remedy the problems inherent in the First Commu-
nity Damage Formula, it will be necessary to shift attention from
the community as a whole to the individual units and then to the
nity. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text; and see the discussion following
Illustration 2, infra note 76 and accompanying text.
65 See, e.g., Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 171 Cal. Rptr. at
345 (cost to repair plus lost use); Lash v. Lion Property Corp., 128 Cal. App. 3d 916, 180
Cal. Rptr. 722 (1982) (common loss and damage to individual units); Schmeck v. Sea
Oats Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 441 So. 2d 1092, 1096 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (other
loss included damage to units and cost of reasonable temporary remedial measures);
Stony Ridge Hill Condominium Owners Ass'n. v. Auerbach, 64 Ohio App. 2d 40, 48,
410 N.E.2d 782, 788 (1979) (costs to repair plus loss of use).
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individual unit owners. In order to facilitate this process, let us
posit the following case example:
Belaire Condominium is a community consisting of ten residen-
tial units, two in each of five buildings. The units are lettered
"A" through "J". Each unit consists of individually owned air-
space, contained within apartments, and a ten percent undivided
interest in the common elements. Included in the common ele-
ments are the structural members of each building (including
foundations, load-bearing walls, and roofs), the space above the
property, landscaped grounds, soil beneath the complex, and cer-
tain limited common elements such as terraces and garages.
The community is governed by the Belaire Condominium As-
sociation (hereinafter the Association), which also holds legal ti-
tle to a parcel of land donated to it by the developer. This land is
improved by a swimming pool, a tennis court, and a small build-
ing for clubhouse use. Each unit pays assessments equal to ten
percent of the total association budget.
Construction of the community began in January 1980 and
ended on December 31 of the same year. The declaration was
filed and the Association formed on July 1, 1980. Sales com-
menced in September 1980, and continued until January 1983.
The developer relinquished control of the Association on Decem-
ber 31, 1981. Judgment against the developer in a lawsuit
brought by the Association on behalf of all present and prior unit
owners was filed on December 31, 1985.
Illustrations to demonstrate the problems inherent in common
property damage calculation and to aid in the development of addi-
tional formulae to deal with those problems will be drawn from the
foregoing model. These illustrations are not intended to be defini-
tive in themselves; they are merely sign posts along the way.
Illustration 1.
The drainage system of the complex was constructed defec-
tively. It will cost $10,000 to correct, none of which has yet been
spent. The initial owner of Unit A (hereinafter referred to as Al)
purchased his unit in January 1981 directly from the developer.
He currently lives there. Al suffered personal injury when he
slipped on ice located on the sidewalk. The ice was attributable
to water which streamed down the sidewalk as a result of defec-
tive drainage and which then froze overnight.
In calculating the damages attributable to the owner of Unit A,
we can start with Farnsworth's Formula A:66
Da = LIV. - CA. + OLa
66 See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
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Because Al was an initial purchaser and probably had no notice of
the drainage defects at the time of his purchase, the deficiencies pre-
sumably did not affect his purchase price. Accordingly, there is no
cost avoided. Because the damage is remediable, the loss in value
portion of the equation is equal to Unit A's proportion of the total
cost to repair. This proportion will not be based on remedial work
undertaken by individual unit owners. In most communities the
Association will be required to make repairs and will be the only
entity authorized to do so." The cost of any work done will be paid
for through assessments levied upon each unit according to the pro-
portions specified in the condominium declaration-generally ac-
cording to each unit's appurtenant share in the common elements.
Thus, the share of the total damages attributable to Unit A will
be calculated as follows:
Da = .10 X CTR +OLa
D, = .10 X $10,000 + damages for personal injury
Da = $1000 + damages for personal injury
Al's other loss (his personal injury damage) will have to be
pleaded and proven separately. Indeed, while it is theoretically pos-
sible for there to be a common claim for other loss (as when the
association suffers personal property damage, or its clubhouse is so
defective it must rent an alternative facility), in real life it is almost
always the sum of individual claims.6" However, this fact will not
67 Nearly all condominium declarations have clauses authorizing the association to
make repairs and limiting the right of unit owners to do so, at least without association
consent. See, e.g., DECLARATION OF CLIFF DWELLINGS CONDOMINIuMS, art. VI, § 1
(Custer County, Colo.); S. LEE, supra note 1, at 236-38. Typical declaration wording is
also to be found in Schmeck, 441 So. 2d at 1096, n.6. The association's duty to repair
has important implications for measuring the damages of investor owners. See infra
notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
68 Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc., 114 Cal. App. 3d at 802, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 345 (lost
use of facilities); Lash, 128 Cal. App. 3d at 920, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 724 (personal property
damage and water damage in some units); Schmeck, 441 So. 2d 1092 (water leakage into
several units and remedial measures taken by some unit owners); Welch v. Point of
Americas Condominium Apartments, Inc., 373 So. 2d 60 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979)
(damages for fraud may differ among different owners); Goldenfarb v. Land Design
Inc., 409 A.2d 662 (Me. 1979) (promised parking for certain units not provided); Siller
v. Hartz Mountain Assoc., 93 N.J. 370, 380-81, 461 A.2d 568, 573 (1983) (personal
property damage hypothesized); Stony Ridge Hill Condominium Owners Ass'n, 64 Ohio
App. 2d 40, 410 N.E.2d 782 (loss of use of building); Frantz v. CBI Fairmac Corp., 229
Va. 444, 447-48, 331 S.E.2d 390, 394-95 (1985) (location of some units would cause
them to be especially affected by developer's breach); Rouse v. Glascam Builders, Inc.,
101 Wash. 2d 127, 677 P.2d 125 (1984) (defects in limited common element patio ap-
purtenant to one unit).
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usually be grounds for denial of class action or representative action
certification.69
Breaking other loss into common and individual damages results
in the following equation, the Second Community Damage
Formula:
D = CTR + OL(assn) + OLai -... OL
(where al is the first owner of Unit A and jn is the last owner of
Unit J). The Second Community Damage Formula is employed in
figuring a community's total award where all defects are reparable.
E. The Problem of Successive Owners: Attributing
Damages to Individuals
In Illustration 1, Unit A had been sold to owner A1, but had not
changed hands between the time it was initially sold and the time of
judgment. If there have been successive owners of a unit, however,
should the common damages be allocated between them? If so,
how? Some courts have been frankly puzzled by this question. For
example, in Tassan v. United Development Company,70 the plaintiffs
were all original owners of units in a condominium called "Village
on the Lake Condominium No. 5.''7" They initiated a class action
against the developer on behalf of themselves and "all past and
present owners of units in Condominium No. 5." The theories of
liability included claims for breach of express warranty and implied
warranty of habitability. The defendants attacked certification of
the class, arguing that the warranty of habitability did not extend to
remote purchasers,72 and that the developer's express warranty was
not assignable to those remote purchasers. On an interlocutory ap-
peal, the Illinois Appellate Court upheld class certification, reserved
the privity issue for the trial judge, and then added:
6 9 Objections to class action certification because of possible differences in damages
have almost always been overruled by the courts in common property cases. This is
because, whatever the problems of proof on damages, it is more convenient and eco-
nomical to try the issues of liability in one action. Tassan v. United Dev. Co., 88 Ill.
App. 3d 581, 591-93, 410 N.E.2d 902, 913 (1980); Deal v. 999 Lakeshore Ass'n, 94 Nev.
301, 305-07, 579 P.2d 775, 778-79 (1978). Similar considerations militate in favor of
permitting the association to represent all or part of the class. Del Mar Beach Club
Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Imperial Contracting Co., Inc., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 907, 176
Cal. Rptr. 886, 890 (1981); Siller, 93 N.J. 370, 377-79, 461 A.2d 568, 571-72.
70 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E. 2d 902 (1980).
71 410 N.E.2d at 906.
72 At the time, Illinois law was unsettled on the point. The warranty was extended to
remote purchasers in Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 92 Ill. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
[Vol. 66, 1987]
HeinOnline  -- 66 Or. L. Rev. 130 1987
Mending the Social Compact
Each original purchaser owns an undivided interest in the com-
mon elements. As such, it would appear that each original pur-
chaser would be entitled to have all of the common elements
repaired completely if there is shown a breach of an implied war-
ranty of habitability or a breach of the express warranty to repair
defects in the common elements. We have difficulty discerning
how we could separate the interests of the original purchasers in
the common elements from the interests of second purchasers in
the common elements. But we will not attempt here to resolve
this difficulty until the trial court has ruled on whether the sec-
ond purchasers have any rights.7 3
Some courts have been faced with the issue more squarely, but
most of them have reached unsatisfactory resolutions. In a number
of cases, plaintiffs representing current owners only (and sometimes
not even all of those) have been awarded total repair costs without
regard to whether the individuals profiting from the award have suf-
fered any loss, without regard to whether they actually have a claim
under state law, and without serious regard for the potential of fu-
ture claims by other aggrieved parties.74 The next series of illustra-
tions will serve as the vehicle for developing formulae which will
better enable the courts to take such factors into account.
Illustration 2.
The facts being as otherwise stated in Illustration 1, assume
that Unit B was purchased in January 1981 by B1, who sold his
unit to B2 in January 1984. At trial, B1 proves that the unit sold
to B2 at that time for $49,000 (representing fair market value),
which is $600 less than it would have sold for had the drainage
not been defective. Assume the developer is liable to B2 as well
as B1, because the jurisdiction does not impose a privity limita-
tion upon the implied warranty of habitability. Neither B1 nor
B2 has been inconvenienced by the drainage, and neither has
other loss. Calculate the loss attributable to Unit B and appor-
tion it between B) and B2.
It is clear that the total loss attributable to Unit B must be the
sum of the damages attributable to B1 and B2:
Db = Db + Db2
The damages suffered by each of these individuals must, in turn, be
calculable with Farnsworth's Formula A. If we substitute Formula
A into the foregoing equation, we arrive at:
Db = [LIVbl - CAb, + OLbJ + [LIVb2 - CAb2 + OLbi
73 Tassan, 410 N.E.2d at 913.
7 4 On cases that have, and have not, allocated damages, see infra notes 92-113 and
accompanying text.
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Since B1 has already sold his unit, his loss in value is his loss of sales
price75-$600. This amount happens to coincide with B2's cost
avoided, the amount he saved as a result of the defects. We also
know that B2"s loss in value will be the proportion of the (as yet
unpaid) $10,000 repair bill assessable to his unit. Thus,
Db = [600- 0 + 0] + [1000- 600 + 0]
So BJ will recover $600 and B2 will recover $400.
The total loss in value figure, $1000, is exactly the same as was
calculated for Unit A in Illustration 1 - which is proper, since
both units have been in existence for the same period of time and
the same percentage of the common elements is appurtenant to
each. The developer's liability is the same for each unit. But allo-
cating part of the loss attributable to Unit B to owner BJ compen-
sates him for his loss of sales price; it obviates any need for another
lawsuit, and it prevents overcompensation of B2.
Since BI no longer has any interest in the community, it would be
unfair to use his share of the award for repairs. It should be remit-
ted to him to compensate him for his loss of market price. B2"s
share should be paid to the Association to be utilized for repairs. If
such a result will leave the Association without enough money to
correct the deficiencies, it may be that the Association will have to
obtain the balance by levying assessments upon all present owners.
Each present owner's assessment will be reduced by the amount of
the award attributable to that owner.76
Thus, each unit will be assessed $1000. B2 will be credited with
his share of the award ($400) leaving him a $600 balance to pay. B2
has already saved $600 at the expense of rBi by reason of the defects:
the amount assessed from him will give him a whole unit at the
same expenditure he would have paid for a whole unit in the first
place. On the other hand, the entire amount of the award attributa-
ble to A] (a present and original owner) may be utilized to offset
Al's share of the future assessments for repair. Since both his as-
sessment and his credit will be $1000, he will not have a deficiency
to pay.
The foregoing suggests that in order to do substantial justice in a
common property defects lawsuit, prior unit owners should be
made parties-or at least class members. If they claim that the de-
75 See Glisan v. Smolenske, 153 Colo. 274, 387 P.2d 260 (1963).
76 This procedure of assessment/credit is made necessary by the fact that under the
terms of their operative documents, most associations do not have the power to alter the
proportion of assessments imposed on each unit.
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fects reduced the price they received for their units upon sale, they
should have the burden of proving that claim. To the extent they
do not meet the burden of proof (and if the defect was latent or not
commonly known at the time of sale, they will not be able to) dam-
ages will be payable to the association and/or the current owners
rather than to them. Thus, in many such cases, owners like B2 will
not have to yield a portion of their award, and the association will
retain all or most of it for repair.
In the illustrations so far, the Association did not spend repair
funds before judgment. This will not, however, be the usual case.
Consider the following:
Illustration 3.
The facts being as otherwise stated in Illustration 2, Belaire
Condominiums also has defective roofs. Although neither BI
nor B2 has suffered other loss from those roof defects, $1000 was
spent on roof repairs in 1982 (during Bls tenure of ownership)
and $3000 was spent in 1984 (during B2's tenure). Complete re-
pair will cost an additional $3000. At trial, BJ proves that Unit
B sold to B2 in 1984 for $200 less than it would have with proper
roofs.
As in the preceding illustration, the total loss attributable to the
unit is the total of the losses of B1 and B2:
Db = [LIVb1 - CAb + OLbJ + [LIVb2 - CAb2 + OLb27
In this instance, the loss in value for BI is a combination of the
amount of repair costs attributable to his unit during his period of
ownership ($100 of $1000) and the loss in the resale price of his
unit. B2"s loss in value is his proportionate share of repairs made
during his tenure ($300 of $3000) and of future repairs ($300 of
$3000). B2's diminished purchase price provides him with a cost
avoided of $200.
O, = [(100 + 200) - 0 - 0] + [(300 + 300) - 200 + 0]
Thus, if Bi can carry his burden of proof regarding diminution in
sales price, he will recover $300, which should be paid to him di-
rectly. B2, having already had the advantage of a lower purchase
price, will recover $400. This will be more than B2's proportionate
share of the future repair assessment ($300). Therefore, that
amount can be credited to B2"s bill and the $100 balance remitted to
him.
We can confirm our calculations as follows: We know that the
total cost to repair will be $7000, and that the amount attributable to
Unit B will be
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Db = .10 X CTR + OLb, or
Db = .10 X 7000 + 0 = 700
This corresponds to the sum of the amounts recovered by BJ and
B2. If damages had not been apportioned, this amount would have
been collected by B2 only, or by the Association for the benefit of
B2 or other current owners--even though BI suffered much of the
damage attributable to this unit.
This apportionment scheme is of particular importance when,
under applicable state law, the developer has a legal liability to
some, but not all, of the successive owners of a unit. For example, a
statute of limitations may bar recovery by an earlier owner, but not
by a later one. Alternately, there may be no finding of negligence,
and the particular jurisdiction in which the matter arises may limit
the implied warranty of habitability to the first purchaser from a
builder/vendor. Similarly, in a jurisdiction without a privity re-
quirement, the first purchaser may be a party not entitled to war-
ranty protection (such as an investor or a person who has signed a
valid warranty disclaimer), although a subsequent owner qualifies
for protection. An analogous situation may arise in states such as
Colorado, which limit the implied warranty of habitability to initial
purchasers, and permit subsequent purchasers to recover for negli-
gence, but only if the defect was latent at the time the property
changes hands." Moreover, there are jurisdictions that, while rec-
ognizing the implied warranty of habitability, altogether deny re-
covery in negligence for mere "economic losses," i.e., for loss of
bargain.78 Any such jurisdictions imposing a privity requirement in
warranty cases would effectively limit developer liability to the first
owner.
Illustration 4a.
The facts being as otherwise stated in Illustration 3, assume
the plaintiffs allege breach of implied warranty and negligence.
Assume that the property is located in a jurisdiction that requires
privity for recovery on implied warranty theory. Assume further
that the builder is absolved from any negligence.
77 Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc. v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1983). "Latent or hid-
den" defects are defined as "those manifesting themselves after purchase and which are
not discoverable through reasonable inspection." Id. at 1045.
A latent defect would not affect the first purchaser's sales price, but once he had sold
his unit he would presumably be barred from recovery. When the defect is discovered,
the current owner would have a negligence claim. On the other hand, a defect discov-
ered during the tenure of the first owner might well affect the price he could get for the
unit and would provide him with a remedy, although later owners had none.
78 See id. at 1044.
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In this case, local law requires that B2, the remote purchaser, be
denied any recovery. Since Illustration 3 suggests that B1 is entitled
to recover $300, the damages attributable to Unit B should be lim-
ited to that amount.
Illustration 4b.
The facts being as otherwise stated in Illustration 3, assume
there is no privity requirement in this jurisdiction, but BJ signed
a valid disclaimer of warranty. B2 signed no such disclaimer.
In this instance, total recovery attributable to the unit would be
$400 - the share recoverable by B2.
F Apportioning Damages Through Assessment Analysis
The remainder of this Part develops the various formulae and
techniques for apportioning, through assessment analysis, a damage
award to the units in a planned community and the owners of those
units. A discussion of the judicial history and reasons for appor-
tionment appears in Part IV.
1. Remediable Defects: the First Unit Damage Formula
Illustration 5a.
Owner Cl purchased his unit in March 1981, and continues to
reside there. The tennis court, which is a "common area" titled
to the Association, is defective. Cl has no particular interest in
tennis and so has suffered no other loss. The Association spent
$1000 on temporary repair of the tennis court in April 1981, and
another $1000 in March 1985; but to permanently rectify the sit-
uation would require the expenditure of an additional $30,000.
What are the damages attributable to Unit C?
Although several courts have decided questions of association
standing to sue based on whether the alleged defects are titled to the
association ("common areas") or to all owners in common ("com-
mon elements"),79 no such distinction has been drawn for purposes
of damages-nor should there be. The effects of reparable construc-
tion deficiencies upon human beings are exactly the same in both
situations. In each case, there is an increased level of association
assessments imposed to pay for repairs. Indeed, it should be one
goal of damages theory to compensate past and present owners for
the increased level of assessments a defect has caused or, in absence
of recovery, would cause.
79 See, e.g., Raven's Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Dev. Co., 114 Cal. App. 3d
783, 171 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1981); Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. Imperial
Contracting Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981).
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Virtually all planned community organizational documents re-
quire the association to make repairs.8 0 While the board of direc-
tors of the association may exercise discretion regarding how or
when to make those repairs, the fundamental duty remains intact,
and despite his lack of interest in tennis, C1 will be assessed so that
the tennis courts can be corrected. In part, he already has been so
assessed.
It is clear, therefore, that the cost to repair attributable to a unit is
a component of the increase in assessments-both past and future-
which the owners of the unit have been or (in absence of a damage
award) will be forced to pay. But it may not be the only compo-
nent. As mentioned earlier,81 there can be other loss attributable to
the association rather than to any unit owner. Since the association
is incorporeal, its other loss is always financial. If otherwise uncom-
pensated for, this other loss must be paid for by an increase in as-
sessments. Association other loss and any other items of common
other loss, therefore, constitute additional elements in each unit's
increased assessments.
Certain damage items are not assessable, however. These are
non-common damages, injuries unique to particular owners or
particular units. They include each owner's other loss. They also
include certain loss in value items such as reduced rent for
investor-held units and irremediable loss impacting disproportion-
ately upon certain units.82 For purposes of this Article, all injury of
this nature-that is, all non-common, non-assessable injury-will
be called unique loss.
Adding unique loss for each past and present owner to the com-
munity's aggregate past and future assessment increases produces
the Third Community Damage Formula.
D = PIA + FIA +UL 0  +... ULjn
This equation is of mere transitional interest, but when it is reduced
to the unit level it gives us the much more important First Unit
Damage Formula. For Unit C, this is as follows:
D, = PIA, +- FIA, +- UL,
This is the formula employed to allocate to a particular unit the
portion of the award attributable to reparable defects. Applying it
80 See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
81 See supra text accompanying note 68.
82 See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
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to Illustration 5a enables us to determine the damages attributable
to that unit:
Dc = $200 + 3000 + 0
A = $3200
2. Remediable Defects: the First Individual Damage Formula
Illustration 5b.
The facts being as otherwise stated in Illustrations 2 and 5a,
B1 is an avid tennis player. The first $1000 assessed and paid by
the Association for tennis court repair was assessed and paid
during his tenure of Unit B. When he sold his Unit to B2, who
has no particular interest in tennis, the diminution in market
value (reflected in sales price) on the Unit due to the lack of a
suitable court was $300. The second $1000 for tennis court re-
pair was assessed and disbursed during the tenure of B2, and, as
previously indicated, $30,000 remains to be spent. What are the
damages attributable to each successive owner of Unit B?
As indicated previously, the damage to an owner is his loss in
value, less his cost avoided, plus his other loss. As also noted above,
where the defects can be repaired, each non-investor owner's loss in
value is an amalgamation of the increased assessments he has had to
pay (or will have to pay in absence of an award) and any reduction
of price on resale due to defects. His cost avoided is any amount he
saved in purchasing a defective unit due to defects common to the
community. His other loss includes personal injury and property
damage.
After separating re-sale losses common to the community from
those unique to his particular unit and including the latter in the
category of unique loss, in symbolic form, the damage to owner BJ
may be stated:
Dbt = PIAbl + FAbl + ComDim/SPbl - CAb, + ULb]
This is the First Individual Damage Formula. It is utilized where
the defects have been or can be fully repaired. The damages attribu-
table to BJ may be calculated:
DbJ = $100 + 0 + $300 + 0 + loss of use, or
Dbl = $400 + loss of use.
Damage to B2 may be calculated:
Db2 = $100 + 3000 + 0 -300 + 0
Db2 = $2800
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Occasionally a unit will have been owned by more than three per-
sons. This requires allocation of damages among more than three
owners. Insofar as this procedure involves ascertaining who was a
unit owner on the date a repair was paid for, there is little problem.
It is conceivable, although not likely to be proven at trial, that the
second of three owners may have purchased his unit for a lower
price than he would have gotten in absence of the defects and then
sold it for a still greater reduction. In that event, where the First
Individual Damage Formula is utilized, there are figures for both
cost avoided (lower purchase price) and the lower resale price.
3. Remediable Defects/Investor-owners
Illustration 6.
The facts being as otherwise stated in Illustration 3, Units E
and F are not owner-occupied, but are held for investment. Unit
E was purchased by El from the developer in 1981 and was
rented out immediately. The same year, Unit F was bought by
F1, who resided there until July 1, 1982, then rented it out until
July 1, 1983, when he sold it to F2, another investor. F2 contin-
ued to lease out the unit. Assuming a decrease in rental value of
$10.00 per month due to roofing problems, what are the damages
attributable to each of these owners?
Let us consider the individual damage formulae for owner F2 in
order to determine if the damages attributable to an investor differ
in any way from those attributable to a community resident. Of
course, as an investor, owner F2 will not have an implied warranty
claim, since he did not buy the property in question as a home for
himself. Assume, however, that claims in negligence have been es-
tablished as to all parties. In an investment context, cost to repair
does not ordinarily serve as the measure of damages. Here, how-
ever, the Association must make repairs, and the investors are re-
quired to pay the assessments imposed for financing those repairs.
This leads us to surmise that there will be little, if any, difference in
their individual damage formulae.
Professor Farnsworth's equation for commercial loss is derived
from substituting the quantity [collateral income lost - collateral cost
avoided] for loss in value in his Formula A. 3 He thereby arrives at
Formula A':
D = CIL - CCA - DCA + OL
DCA (direct cost avoided) corresponds to "cost avoided" (CA) in his
83 Farnsworth, supra note 49, at 1166.
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Formula A; in the context of this Article, it will be used to take into
account any savings in acquisition costs due to the presence of com-
mon defects. Collateral income lost may occur in any of three ways:
(a) the presence of the defect may drive down rental value (resulting
in rental value lost), (b) higher assessments may cut into cash flow,
and/or (c) property defects may reduce the price available on re-
sale. Substituting those items for owner F2 into Formula A', we
arrive at:
D2 = [R VL9  + PIA9  + FlA9 + Dim/SPpJ - CCA9 - DCA9
+ OL9
As observed earlier, rental value lost is a component of unique
loss.8" That part of the diminution in the market price attributable
to defects impacting disproportionately upon Unit F is also part of
unique loss. If collateral cost avoided is assigned its appropriate
quantity of "zero," direct cost avoided is changed to its equivalent
cost avoided, disproportionate effects on market value are separated
out and included in unique loss, and this statement is thereupon
regrouped, we arrive at:
D2 = PIA9 + FIA9 + ComDim/SP9 - CA2 + UL9
Thus, F2's individual damage formula is identical to the First Indi-
vidual Damage Formula for any other owner. The same results can
be obtained for E, F1, or any other investor." It therefore makes
no difference that F1 purchased his unit for a home and later con-
verted it to investment purposes, or that F2 and El used their units
as investments only. The method of calculation is precisely the
same. Moreover, since the First Unit Damage Formula is merely
the sum of each owner's Individual Damage Formula, there is no
difference in apportioning common damages among investor and
resident-owned units.
84 See supra text accompanying note 82.
85 Fl's share of the damages will be, according to the Second Individual Damage
Formula:
DF) = PIAF, + FfA, + ComDim/SPF, - CAF, + ULF,
DF, = PlA, + 0 + ComDim/SP, - 0 + R VLF,
DF, = $100 + $200 + (10 x 12 mos)
Dr, = $300 + $120
D, = $420
F2's damages will be $700. The two added together will be $1120 (equal to $700 in
increased assessments plus $420 lost rent). El's damages will equal this sum plus
$10.00 per month for the additional months he has suffered rental value lost.
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4. Irremediable Defects
Certain kinds of defects may be designated "irremediable."
These are deficiencies inherent in the community itself, which can
never be corrected (such as the development's location)8 6 or can be
corrected only at a cost so far in excess of the diminution in market
value that a court would deem it "economic waste" to award to the
plaintiff the cost to repair.87 Thus, an award must be fashioned
which takes into account the fact that the defects are permanent,
that the community will always have a lower aggregate value be-
cause of them, that certain units will suffer uniquely, and that the
association may have to levy, over the life of the project, assess-
ments higher than it would have if not for the deficiencies.
The following illustration will provide a case study:
Illustration 7.
The facts being otherwise as stated in the model, Units G and
H are in a building positioned beneath a steep slope. The builder
did not take adequate steps to deal with the slow collapse of the
slope and resultant pressure against the building. Removal of the
slope or building would be impracticable. In late 1985, the Asso-
ciation was forced to construct a retaining wall at a cost of
$2000. The cost of regular upkeep of the wall over the 75-year
projected life of the project is estimated at $300 per annum.
Although none of these $300 installments has yet been paid, at
the time of judgment this projected negative cash flow is esti-
mated to have a net present value88 of $5000. An appraiser has
determined that the erection of the wall has decreased the aes-
thetic attractiveness of Units G and H and that fact alone will
diminish their market value by approximately $2000 each.
The units were sold by the developer to owners GJ and Hi
before the problem became apparent. HI sold to H2 in Decem-
ber 1985, after the wall was constructed. Calculate the damages
as of the end of 1985.
86 See Del Mar Beach Club Owners Ass'n., Inc. v. Imperial Contracting Co., 123 Cal.
App. 3d 898, 176 Cal. Rptr. 886 (1981) (location on an unstable sea front bluff).
87 The issues of "economic waste" are discussed in D. DOBBS, supra note 40, at 898-
903; Farnsworth, supra note 49, at 1170-75; and A. HARRELL, supra note 45, at 162-77.
The best synthesis of the cases is Professor Harrell's. He suggests that when cost to
repair grossly exceeds diminution in value, the latter will be awarded unless (a) repair
would be necessary to restore a central part of the consideration to the landowner, or
(b) the breach was "willful" (that is, culpable in a tort sense).
88 "Net present value" of a series of future cash flows is the sum of the discounted
values of each future cash flow. In this illustration, we would calculate net present
value by selecting a current interest rate (possibly a money market rate), and calculate
the present value of $300 paid a year from now, add to that the present value of $300
paid two years from now, and so on for 75 payments over 75 years. Discounted cash
flow analysis is applied in a condominium setting in A-S Dev., Inc. v. W.R. Grace Land
Corp., 537 F. Supp. 549 (D.N.J. 1982), aff'd, 707 F.2d 1388 (3d Cir. 1983).
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Before attempting to reduce the issues to equation form, several
observations should be made regarding this problem. The damage
to the community is of three kinds. First, there is the loss incurred
in minimizing the problem, a loss represented by the $2000 already
paid. Any damage award can easily compensate for this expendi-
ture by reimbursing the owners of each unit for their proportionate
shares. Second, there is the future negative cash flow of $300 per
year. Since the net present value of this flow is $5000, this is the
common diminution in value to the community resulting from the
irremediable damage. 9 This portion of the award should be allo-
cated to benefit all units. Third, there is damage unique to two
units-those adjacent to the problem-in the amount of $2000
each. This part of the award should go to the owners of those two
units.
Thus, the total award ($11,000) will be distributed among the
units as follows: (a) $2000 among ten units equally, or $200 per
unit, for past increased assessments; (b) $500 among ten units
equally in lieu of higher future assessments; and (c) $2000 each to
the owners of Units G and H.
Recall that the Third Community Damage Formula was
D = PIA + FIA + UL i+... ULjn
This formula is adequate to deal with Illustration 7 if modified in
one particular: the figure for "future assessments" must be reduced
to its present net value. Previously, that was not necessary, since
when future assessments represented merely the cost of repairing
items which had not yet been remedied it was assumed that the
money would be spent for repairs within a relatively short time after
it had been made available to the Association. But in Illustration 7,
future assessments will be disbursed over a 75-year period; hence,
the need to determine present value.
It would seem to follow that past assessments should also be ad-
justed in value to the time of judgment. It is true that an ideal
award would take into consideration the present value of assess-
ments paid months or even years earlier. This matter, however, is
generally regulated by the prejudgment interest provisions of state
89 "Remediable damage" and "irremediable damage" are called "temporary damage"
and "permanent damage" by some courts. See, e.g., Stony Ridge Hill Condominium
Owners Ass'n v. Auerbach, 64 Ohio App. 2d 40, 47, 410 N.E.2d 782, 788 (1979); but
the latter terms are deceptive, so they are avoided here. See D. DOBBS, supra note 40, at
313-14, 337.
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law and court rules and thus cannot be reduced to equation form
here.
The foregoing analysis leads, therefore, to the Fourth Commu-
nity Damage Formula, derived from adding the discounted value of
future assessments for irremediable defects to the Second Commu-
nity Damage Formula.
D = CTR + NPV of FIA(irrem) + OL(assn) + OLa1 +
.. OL.
This Fourth Community Damage Formula may be utilized to cal-
culate an award in all cases, not just in irremediable defects cases.
However, when future repairs will be made within a relatively short
time, the net present value of future assessments (cost of future re-
pairs) will not differ appreciably from the total dollar amount of
future assessments.
Next, a formula to employ when irremediable defects must be
attributed to particular units is necessary. This is the Second Unit
Damage Formula for Unit G (the unit which has not been resold):
Dg = PIAg + NPV of FlAg + ULg
Now, the net present value of the future assessments in Unit G is
theoretically equal to the diminution in value of that unit common
to the community as a whole (that is, the diminution due to higher
assessments only and apart from G's proximity to the retaining
wall). Thus, the Second Unit Damage Formula can also be stated
as follows:
Dg = PIAg + ComDim/SPg + ULg
Substituting the applicable numbers for Unit G gives us:
D = $200 + 500 + $2000, or
Dg = $2700
Next, the damages for owners HI and H2 should be calculated.
Just as the First Unit Damage Formula was converted into the Sec-
ond Unit Damage Formula by discounting the future assessments
component, the same can be done to derive the Second Individual
Damage Formula, for use when some of the defects are irremedia-
ble. For owner HI, that formula would be
Dhl - PIAhl + NPV of FIAhl + ComDim/SPhl - CA,,, + ULh1
HI paid his unit's proportionate share of the $2000 cost of the
retaining wall ($200), but will have no future assessments since he
no longer lives in the complex. The diminution in value of his unit
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was $2500 - $500 due to a problem common to the community
(the higher assessments)9" and $2000 due to a situation unique to
his unit. Making the appropriate substitutions results in the
following:
Dhl = $200 + 0 + 500 - 0 + 2000, or
Dhl= $2700
H2's damages should be "zero" since they were patent when he
bought his unit, and the illustration states that the market price was
adjusted accordingly. Whether he would be permitted to recover
for personal injury or property damage due to such patent defects is
a question of local law.9'
5. Assessment Analysis: Conclusion
This section has demonstrated that whether the individual own-
ers are investors or homeowners, whether they were initial purchas-
ers or remote purchasers, and whether the construction defects are
reparable or irreparable, assessment analysis provides a viable basis
for allocating a common damage award among units. Of course,
neither compensation for unique losses nor reduction in market
value is calculable through assessment analysis. They must be
proven by - and paid separately to - the owners who incurred
those losses.
IV
To ALLOCATE OR NOT TO ALLOCATE
The Illinois court in Tassan v. United Development Co.92 could
speculate on whether to, and how to, allocate damages among suc-
cessive owners without actually having to deal with the matter.
Several other courts have had to face the problem more directly,
90 Although the concept is too new to have yielded any empirical data, an increased
level of assessments should, ceteris paribus, decrease the value of a unit in a planned
community. Generally real estate brokers and lenders "qualify" potential property pur-
chasers based on the amount of monthly payments they can afford. The owner of a unit
in a planned community typically will make monthly payments consisting of mortgage
principal and interest, taxes, insurance, and assessments. Given a prospective buyer
with a particular income, the more he will have to pay in assessments, the less will be
left over for financing. Hence, prices in the community will have to drop in order for
units in that community to sell. The concept is similar to the depressive effect on the
value of higher expenses in commercial properties. AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL
ESTATE APPRAISERS, supra note 56, at 320. See also S. LEE, supra note 1, at 21.
91 See supra notes 20-34 and accompanying text.
92 88 Ill. App. 3d 581, 410 N.E.2d 902 (1980).
HeinOnline  -- 66 Or. L. Rev. 143 1987
OREGON LAW REVIEW
and the results have varied. A judicial decision in which allocation
was called for, but not instituted, was issued in the Florida District
Court of Appeal's case of Drexel Properties, Inc. v. Bay Colony Club
Condominium, Inc.93 In Drexel, the plaintiffs were a condominium
association and certain representative unit owners. In a suit against
the developer, they alleged the existence of certain defects in the
condominium, including (1) absence of aluminum fencing required
by the construction plan filed with governmental authorities,
(2) ceilings that were not sufficiently fire-resistant to comply with
fire regulations, and (3) bedroom windows which did not open suffi-
ciently to comply with those same regulations. The plaintiffs' theo-
ries of liability were negligence and breach of implied warranty.
After finding for the plaintiffs on both counts, the trial court
awarded them the full cost of repair for all three items.
On appeal, the developer argued (a) that a privity requirement
should be imposed for warranty recovery, (b) that recovery based
on negligence should not be recognized for economic loss, and
(c) that the trial court should have denied damages to the plaintiffs
insofar as they represented subsequent, rather than original, pur-
chasers-in other words, that the damages should have been
apportioned.
The court agreed that privity was necessary for recovery on a
warranty claim, but recognized a cause of action for negligence on
behalf of both immediate and remote purchasers.94 It found that,
with respect to both the window and ceiling defects, there had been
both negligence and breach of warranty.95 It further found that a
warranty claim had arisen from the fencing defect, but that there
had been no negligence with respect to that item.96 This last finding
should have had the effect of barring subsequent purchasers from
recovery for defective fencing. Nevertheless, the court concluded as
follows:
We hold that as to common elements, the appellees may recover
the entire damages on either theory, albeit the subsequent or re-
mote purchasers will benefit thereby. To conclude otherwise and
apportion the damages would penalize the original purchasers.
In order for appellees to receive the benefit of their bargain and
be made whole, the amount of damages awarded must equal the
93 406 So. 2d 515 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981), rev. denied, 417 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1982).
9 4 1d. at 519.
95 1d. at 520.
96/d.
[Vol. 66, 1987]
HeinOnline  -- 66 Or. L. Rev. 144 1987
Mending the Social Compact
sum necessary to correct the condition.97
The court also stated, as an additional reason for affirming the
award for the ceiling defects, that "it was appropriate to award en-
tire damages on implied warranty because it concerns common
elements."9
The court's reasoning is clearly erroneous. An apportioned
award for the fencing would preserve the benefit of the original pur-
chasers' bargain by reimbursing them (and only them) for the fu-
ture assessment increases that repairs would make necessary. The
association could, in other words, retain that portion of the award
attributable to future repairs and credit it to the assessment invoices
sent to original purchasers who still owned their units. Subsequent
purchasers would be duly assessed without offset. The original pur-
chasers would get the "benefit of their bargain," because, at no cost
to them, the repairs would be made - for the association was (or
could be) legally required to make them.9 9
At first glance, it appears possible that the Drexel court commit-
ted harmless error. While the facts are not entirely clear, it is possi-
ble the plaintiffs therein were representing former owners as well as
present owners. If the warranty damages of former owners were
included in the award, it would indeed have equalled entire cost of
repair. However, there is no evidence that the former owners actu-
ally received any portion of the award, or that the court heard evi-
dence from them of their reduced sales prices, or that the court
considered any defect-related assessments they had paid during
their periods of ownership. It appears that the court intended that
the entire award be utilized for future remedial measures, thus bene-
fiting those unit owners in a manner not otherwise sanctioned by
law."°° Had the court applied the Individual Damage Formulae set
97 1d. at 519-20.
98 Id. at 520.
99 Supra note 67.
100 A similar error in reasoning had been made two years earlier in Stony Ridge Hill
Condominium Owners Ass'n v. Auerbach, 64 Ohio App. 2d 40, 410 N.E.2d 782 (1979),
where the court held that although only four of 24 unit owners had proven fraud
"[e]ach person who purchased a condominium unit, as a result of the misrepresentation,
has a right to have the whole damage to the entire common area of the building reme-
died and completely satisfied." 64 Ohio App. 2d at 43, 410 N.E.2d at 785.
While this is true, it doesn't follow that the developer should pay the entire bill.
However, Stony Ridge Hill can be justified on other grounds, L e., that in a class action
like setting, illustrative testimony by a few homeowners was adequate to establish fraud
as to the entire class. Brickyard Homeowners' Ass'n Management Comm. v. Gibbons
Realty Co., 668 P.2d 535, 543 (Utah 1983).
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forth above, it would not have wandered into error.
In Juno By the Sea Condominium Apartments, Inc. v. Juno By the
Sea North Condominium Association,'° ! decided by the same court
nine months later, Drexel was cited to justify granting an entire re-
pair award to an association plaintiff without proper allocation. 0 2
In Juno there were apparently no individual plaintiffs, and no at-
tempt had been made to include former owners in the case or to
afford them due notice of the proceedings. As a result, the court
permitted remote purchasers, who otherwise would have had no
legal right to recovery (and who may have already benefited from
lower acquisition prices), to appropriate - without notice - funds
that rightfully belonged to earlier unit owners. Yet just a year ear-
lier, after a Texas trial judge made an analogous error, that state's
court of civil appeals had quite properly reversed:
The judgment also granted a recovery on behalf of all owners
against the defendants, and ordered the money expended for cer-
tain specific repairs and maintenance of the common elements.
Thus, the interests of the absent owners will be affected by the
judgment; yet they have not had their day in court. Even under
the liberalized version of our Rule 39 . . . the absent owners
should have been made parties.' 0 3
The Texas appeals tribunal was speaking of the need to join all pres-
ent unit owners in a common element suit, but its reasoning is
equally applicable to prior unit owners, and the court in Juno
should have applied it. Perhaps other courts will do so.
At any rate, it appears that when an association suit or other
representative action is commenced, the plaintiffs should include
prior owners within the plaintiff class (preferably in one or more
subclasses), and duly notify them of the proceedings in the manner
in which class members are usually notified. Specifically, they
should be informed of their right to intervene through their own
counsel, that they may be entitled to a refund of certain assessments
levied while they were owners, that they may avail themselves of the
opportunity to prove additional damages, and that any judgment
obtained in the proceeding will be binding on them. If the plaintiffs
do not do so, the defendants should be permitted to insist upon noti-
101 418 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
102 Id. at 1191-92. The error of Drexel has crept into other decisions as well. See,
e.g., Starfish Condominium Ass'n v. Yorkridge Serv. Corp., 458 A.2d 805, 812-13 (Md.
1983).
103 Scott v. Williams, 607 S.W.2d 267, 270-71 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (emphasis in
original). On the res judicata effect of an association suit on the members, see Brickyard
Homeowners'Ass'n Management Comm., 668 P.2d at 541.
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fication of prior owners or upon an opportunity to prove any offsets
attributable to them.10 4
Earlier, an allusion was made to jurisdictions which have denied
associations standing to sue for common element defects."0 5 Deci-
sions in those jurisdictions are illustrative of a judicial mindset
which, for common element purposes, essentially ignores the exist-
ence of the association as sole managing agent and focuses exclu-
sively upon the interests of the co-owners. Drexel and Juno are
illustrative of the opposite error: they disregard the fact that each
community is comprised of co-owners who may have different, and
occasionally even contradictory, interests. The decision in
Goldenfarb v. Land Design, Inc. 106 is a further example of this latter
outlook. In Goldenfarb, the developer of a condominium had sold
fourteen "large units" and ten smaller units to members of the pub-
lic. Plaintiffs had each purchased a "large unit." They alleged that
the defendant had represented to them that each "large unit" would
enjoy the use of two parking spaces on the common elements,
although smaller units would have just one each. Of the total of
thirty-eight promised spaces, however, only thirty-five proved to be
of adequate size.
A referee found that total damages had amounted to $3900 and
awarded one-fourth of that amount to each of the four plaintiffs.
The superior court affirmed the award, and the defendant-developer
appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Maine sustained the
result as to liability, but reversed as to the allocation of damages.
First, it assumed that the $3900 award was intended to reflect the
entire damage to the community rather than to the individual plain-
tiffs (an assumption that was not clearly correct). 7 Then it or-
dered that the case be remanded for "(a) a finding of the respective
percentage of ownership interests of the Plaintiffs and (b) an award
to the Plaintiff unit owners of each unit represented in this cause of
their aliquot portion of the total loss sustained by all the owners of
the common areas."'' 0 8
To an extent, the Court's allocation was proper, but it was alloca-
104 These offsets may include amounts attributable to the developer if it paid assess-
ments and the association ordered repairs. For a case on credits against a repair award,
see Resort Properties, Inc. v. Jupiter Inlet Condominium Ass'n, 443 So. 2d 1033 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
105 See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
106 409 A.2d 662 (Me. 1979).
107 Id. at 665.
108 Id. at 665-66.
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tion which ignored the differences between owners - the differ-
ences in each owner's unique loss." 9 Each of the plaintiffs had been
promised two parking spaces. Due to the shortage, however, at
least three of them had received only one. Obviously their damage
was a good deal more than that of those unit owners who received
what they had been promised. Application of proper Unit and Indi-
vidual Damage Formulae would have improved the chances of their
being properly compensated.
A more adequate allocation structure was applied in REC Cen-
ters, Inc. v. Shaughnessy.110 There, a class of condominium owners
had sued for recovery of improper overcharges on a recreation lease
and had won an award for the entire amount of the overcharges,
despite the fact that the class did not include prior unit owners.
The appeals court reversed the award insofar as it included excess
amounts paid by prior owners and limited the recovery to
overcharges imposed on the class members, i.e., the current unit
owners.
In Andrikopoulos v. Broadmoor Management Co.,"1 ' overcharges
on an association management contract were correctly allocated to
the owners whose assessments had been thus improperly increased.
The court suggested that "the Association was in an ideal position
to represent all of the owners and to disburse the award among
them." 2 While neither REC Centers nor Andrikopoulos involved
causes of action for common property defects, it is difficult to dis-
cern why that should make any difference.
One reason there has been judicial resistance to allocation of
damage awards, although never openly expressed, is a general impa-
tience with the magnitude and complexity of these cases and an un-
willingness to complicate them any further. Yet, it is well to
remember that the alternative to allocation is often to reward unde-
109 See supra note 82 and accompanying text. The Goldenfarb court pointed out that
it was the association which actually allocated the spaces. It is difficult to see what
difference that made, since the loss to the plaintiffs was the same. Had there been 38
spaces, each of the plaintiffs would have had two spaces rather than one. Another case
not properly protecting unit owners' legitimate interest in their unique loss is Frantz v.
CBI Fairmac Corp., 229 Va. 444, 331 S.E.2d 390 (1985). In Frantz, individual unit
owners, uniquely damaged due to their proximity to the developer's improper commer-
cial development, were denied the right to intervene in the association's lawsuit against
the developer where the proposed settlement would bind them, but where the terms of
the settlement disregarded their unique interests. Id.
110407 So. 2d 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
111 670 P.2d 435 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983).
112Id. at 439.
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serving parties and punish deserving ones. Moreover, failure to al-
locate results in determinations of liability inconsistent with the
jurisdiction's other law - and for no reasons other than the
number of parties involved or the legal form of the community's
governing documents.
As for the complexity concern, it is the author's experience that
the process of allocation has proven daunting only in very large
communities with extensive construction deficiencies. Yet, such
communities often have the resources to afford the computer time
or clerical personnel necessary to undertake even the most compli-
cated allocation task. But such extreme cases are rare. Most com-
munities will have suffered two or three major defects, for which
several easily identifiable repairs have been made. Since applicable
statutes of limitation ensure that any community suing the devel-
oper on a common defects claim will be relatively new, most units
will still be owned by those who originally bought them. Among
prior owners, few, if any, are likely to intervene to prove loss in
market value. Demonstrated items of unique loss, such as personal
injury or property damage, will tend to be limited in quantity and
easily identifiable.
V
SUMMARY: MEASURING AND ALLOCATING
EXPECTANCY DAMAGES
This section summarizes the procedures to be employed in calcu-
lating and allocating damages for defects in common property
cases. The four basic steps are as follows:
First: In absence of a statute prescribing a different approach, 13
the total damage to the community should be pleaded and proven
using one of the Community Damage Formulae. Where all defects
are reparable, the equation best employed is the Second Community
Damage Formula:' 14
Damage = cost to repair + other loss attributable to the
association + other loss attributable to each past and pres-
ent owner
In symbolic form:
D = CTR + OL(assn) + OL 1 . . + OLp,
113The author has found none. But see UNIF. CONDOMINIUM ACT. § 1-114, 7
U.L.A. 452 (1985) (expectancy damages specifically authorized).
114 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
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As noted earlier, judicial support for this equation and the closely
related First Community Damage Formula is substantial."1 5
If some of the defects are irremediable, the net present value of
any resultant future additional maintenance costs caused by those
deficiencies, that is, future higher assessments, should be added to
the Second Community Damage Formula. Moreover, any irreme-
diable decrease in the value of particular units should be included in
the other loss attributable to those units. Thus,
D = CTR + NPV of FIA(irrem) + OL(assn) + 0L.1
. .. +- OLJ"
This formula may also be employed where the defects are remedia-
ble and will be repaired soon. In that case, however, the net present
value of the future assessments is essentially the same as the dollar
amount of the future assessments.
Second: The next task is to allocate the damages among units in
the community. Common, i.e., assessable, expenditures that have
already been made may be lumped together and allocated among
units by multiplying each unit's share of the common elements by
the total expenses incurred. Future expenditures - whether dis-
counted or not - should be similarly multiplied.
Some or all unit owners may have unique loss. This includes all
non-assessable items, such as (1) other loss (e.g., loss of use, per-
sonal injury, property damage), (2) in the case of an investor,
proven lost rental value, and (3) any irremediable loss of market
value unique to a unit. The process of allocating the award among
units is best summarized by the Second Unit Damage Formula, the
sum of past assessments attributable to defect repairs, the unit's pro
rata share of the net present value of any future assessments, and
that unit owners' unique loss. If applied to Unit J, the equation in
symbolic form is:
D = PIAJ + NPV of FIAJ + ULJ116
Damages may be allocated on the basis 6f that formula to all unit
owners who purchased from the developer and have not sold their
units as of the date of judgment. Usually that will include a major-
ity of the owners, since a common element defects case is almost
always resolved when the complex is just a few years old.
It is possible that the amount of the award is based upon settle-
115 See supra notes 65, 68 and accompanying text.
116See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 66, 19871
HeinOnline  -- 66 Or. L. Rev. 150 1987
Mending the Social Compact
ment; if so, it may represent a recognition by the parties of potential
liability on some claims and not other claims. To the extent practi-
cable, the allocation of the award among units should take into ac-
count which defects are being compensated for and any pro-rata
level of compensation agreed to.
Third: For those units that have changed hands, another step is
necessary. Any prior expenses must be pinpointed as to their date
and allocated to the owners who held units on that date. If there
have been numerous small expenses, the parties may wish to allo-
cate them on a monthly, quarterly, or annual basis (making the
rough assumption, for example, that an owner who had title to a
unit at the beginning of a quarter held it throughout the quarter).
Unique losses must be attributed to the proper unit owners as well, if
they have been pleaded and proven by those owners. Similarly, if
any prior owner has proven that defects resulted in a reduction of
his price on resale (DimSP)'17 or, in the absence of prior owners,
the defendants have demonstrated that subsequent owners are
either (1) not entitled as a matter of law to recovery,"' or (2) have
benefited from lower acquisition prices," 9 then the appropriate ad-
justments must be made.
When all the defects can be repaired, the formula employed for
calculating the loss attributable to an individual owner is the First
Individual Damage Formula. 2  This is the sum of any past and
future assessments the owner must pay (past increased assessments
plus future increased assessments), plus any diminution in his resale
price (if he has sold his unit) due to general community defects
(ComDim/SP), less any savings in his acquisition cost as a result of
those defects (CA - cost avoided), plus his unique loss. This last
element will include injury to person or personal property, loss of
use or reduction in rental proceeds, and diminution in resale price
due to common defects which impact disproportionately upon his
unit. This is the First Individual Damage Formula for owner J1:
Djl = PIAj1 + FIAj, + ComDim/SP1 - CAj, + ULj
Where some of the defects are irremediable, this equation is altered
by substitution of the net present value of future increased assess-
ments. This is the Second Individual Damage Formula:
117 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. See generally notes 70-78 and accom-
panying text.
118 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
119 See supra text accompanying note 75.
120 See infra Part III(F)(2).
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Dj] = PIAj1, + NPV oFIAJ, + ComDim/SP., - CAjj + ULjg
Fourth: Once the sums are allocated, they must be distributed.
All sums proven to be due to persons who no longer own units
should be distributed to those persons. As to persons who currently
own units, each owner proving unique loss should be directly paid
the sums attributable to that unique loss. All assessments attributa-
ble to prior repairs should be remitted directly to the owners who
paid them or be credited to their future assessment bills. They
should not be retained by the association and credited to a general
fund. That would be unfair, since different amounts will be attribu-
table to different owners. The same procedure should be followed
for all awards for the discounted value of recurrent future assess-
ments (that is, for irremediable defects). Amounts awarded for fu-
ture repairs should be retained by the association, preferably in a
trust fund, for the purpose of making those repairs.'
121 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
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